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Abstract
The purported fact that geometric theories formulated in terms of
points and geometric theories formulated in terms of lines are “equally
correct” is often invoked in arguments for conceptual relativity, in partic-
ular by Putnam and Goodman. We discuss a few notions of equivalence
between first-order theories, and we then demonstrate a precise sense in
which this purported fact is true. We argue, however, that this fact does
not undermine metaphysical realism.
1 Introduction
Late 20th century philosophy witnessed a distinctive movement away from meta-
physical realism. This movement, particularly evident in the work of Goodman,
Putnam, and Quine, was motivated by certain examples from logic and science.
Most notably, Putnam and Goodman often cited the example of Euclidean ge-
ometry, arguing that there is no answer to the question of whether the Euclidean
plane is made of points, or whether points are instead derived entities. We will
call this example the argument from geometry.
According to the argument from geometry, certain situations could equally
well be described using a theory that takes points as fundamental entities, or
instead using a theory that takes lines as fundamental entities. Someone who
adopts the first theory is committed to the existence of points and not lines,
while someone who adopts the second theory is committed to the existence of
lines and not points. But points and lines are different kinds of things, and in
general, the number of points (according to the first theory) will be different
from the number of lines (according to the second theory). Since both parties
correctly describe the world, but use different ontologies to do so, it follows that
there is no matter of fact about what the ontology of the world is. This directly
contradicts a fundamental tenet of metaphysical realism.
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In responding to examples of this sort, metaphysical realists typically grant
that the two theories in question involve incompatible ontological commitments
(see Sider, 2009; Van Inwagen, 2009). They then claim, however, that at most
one of the two theories can be correct, at least in a fundamental sense. The
upshot of this kind of response, of course, is that a realist ontology has been
purchased at the price of an epistemic predicament: Only one of the theories is
correct, but we will never know which one.
Our purpose in this paper is to suggest another reply to arguments of this
sort, and specifically to the argument from geometry. We show that geometries
with points can naturally be considered equivalent to geometries with lines, and
we argue that this equivalence does not in any way threaten the idea that there is
an objective world. In other words, since these two theories are equivalent, there
is a sense in which they involve exactly the same ontological commitments. The
example of geometries with points and geometries with lines does not undermine
metaphysical realism in the way that Putnam and Goodman suggested.
2 Preliminaries
There are many ways to formulate a particular geometric theory, and these for-
mulations often differ with respect to the kinds of objects that are taken as
primitive. The most famous example of this phenomenon is Euclidean geome-
try. Tarski first formulated Euclidean geometry using open balls (Tarski, 1929),
and later using points (Tarski, 1959). Schwabha¨user and Szczerba (1975) for-
mulated Euclidean geometry using lines, and Hilbert (1930) used points, lines,
planes, and angles. These formulations of Euclidean geometry all take differ-
ent kinds of objects to be primitive, but despite this ostensible difference, they
nonetheless manage to express the same geometric facts. Indeed, it is standard
to recognize some sense in which all of these formulations of Euclidean geome-
try are equivalent. This sense of equivalence, however, is rarely made perfectly
precise.1
In fact, from a certain point of view, it might seem that these theories cannot
be equivalent. Consider a simple example: Take six lines in the Euclidean plane,
as in the following diagram.
1Beth and Tarski (1956), Scott (1956), Tarski (1956), Robinson (1959), and Royden (1959)
focus on the relationships between formulations of geometry that use different primitive pred-
icate symbols, but not different primitive sort symbols. Szczerba (1977) and Schwabha¨user
et al. (1983) take crucial steps toward capturing the relationships between geometries with dif-
ferent sorts, but do not explicitly prove their equivalence. Andre´ka et al. (2008) and Andre´ka
and Ne´meti (2014), however, introduce a collection of tools from definability theory that allows
one to demonstrate a precise equivalence.
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On the one hand, if this diagram were described in terms of the point-based
version of Euclidean geometry (Tp), then we would say that there are exactly
five things. On the other hand, if this diagram were described in terms of the
line-based version of Euclidean geometry (T`), then we would say that there are
exactly six things. The point-based and line-based descriptions therefore seem
to disagree about a feature of the diagram — namely, how many things there
are in the diagram.
Indeed, according to one natural notion of theoretical equivalence, the first
description Tp is not equivalent to the second description T`. This notion is
called definitional equivalence, and was introduced into philosophy of science by
Glymour (1971, 1977, 1980). If two theories are definitionally equivalent, then
the cardinalities of their respective domains will be equal. Since the domains
of Tp and T` do not have the same cardinality, these descriptions cannot be
definitionally equivalent.
This would be the end of the matter if definitional equivalence were the only
legitimate notion of theoretical equivalence. There is, however, a better notion
of theoretical equivalence that does not prejudge issues about the cardinality
of domains. We will now expend some effort explaining this more expansive
notion of equivalence; to do so will require that we enter into the framework
of many-sorted logic. We therefore begin with some preliminaries about this
framework.2
A signature Σ is a set of sort symbols, predicate symbols, function symbols,
and constant symbols. Every signature is required to contain at least one sort
symbol. The predicate, function, and constant symbols in Σ are assigned arities
constructed from sorts in Σ. The arity of a symbol specifies which sorts the
symbol “applies to.” The Σ-terms, Σ-formulas, and Σ-sentences are recursively
defined in the standard way. The only difference from the syntax of single-sorted
logic is that the quantifiers ∀σ and ∃σ that appear in Σ-formulas are indexed
by sorts σ ∈ Σ. We will occasionally drop these indices, but only when it is
perfectly clear what sort of variables are being quantified over.
2The reader is encouraged to consult Hodges (2008) and Barrett and Halvorson (2016) for
further details.
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A Σ-structure A is a family of nonempty and pairwise disjoint sets Aσ, one
for each sort symbol σ ∈ Σ, in which the predicates, functions, and constant
symbols in Σ have been interpreted. One recursively defines when elements
a1, . . . , an ∈ A satisfy a Σ-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) in the Σ-structure A, written
A  φ[a1, . . . , an]. A Σ-theory T is a set of Σ-sentences. The sentences φ ∈ T
are called the axioms of T . A Σ-structure M is a model of a Σ-theory T if
M  φ for all φ ∈ T . A theory T entails a sentence φ, written T  φ, if M  φ
for every model M of T .
We now have the resources to state the following preliminary criterion for
theoretical equivalence.
Definition 1. Theories T1 and T2 are logically equivalent if they have the
same class of models.
One can verify that theories T1 and T2 are logically equivalent if and only
if they entail precisely the same sentences. It is therefore easy to see that
logical equivalence is too strict to capture any kind of equivalence between
geometries with points and geometries with lines. Theories can only be logically
equivalent if they are formulated in the same signature. Since these formulations
of geometry employ different sort symbols — some are formulated in signatures
with a sort of lines, others are formulated in signatures with a sort of points —
they cannot be logically equivalent.
3 Morita equivalence
Logical equivalence is a particularly strict criterion for theoretical equivalence, so
many other criteria for theoretical equivalence have been proposed. We call the
criterion considered here Morita equivalence.3 The intuition behind Morita
equivalence is simple, and similar criteria have been known to logicians for
many years. Theories T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent if T1 can define all of
the vocabulary that T2 uses, and in a compatible way, T2 can define all of the
vocabulary that T1 uses. It takes a bit of work to make this intuition precise.
In particular, we need to formalize the concept of a definition. We begin
by saying how to define new predicate, function, and constant symbols. Let
Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures and let p ∈ Σ+ − Σ be a predicate symbol of arity
σ1 × . . .× σn. An explicit definition of p in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of
the form
∀σ1x1 . . . ∀σnxn
(
p(x1, . . . , xn)↔ φ(x1, . . . , xn)
)
3In addition to the criterion proposed by Glymour (1971, 1977, 1980), see Quine (1975)
for another. See de Bouve´re (1965), Kanger (1968), Pinter (1978), Pelletier and Urquhart
(2003), Andre´ka et al. (2005), Friedman and Visser (2014), and Barrett and Halvorson (2015a,
2016, 2015b) for some results that have been proven about different standards of equivalence.
Barrett and Halvorson (2016) provide an introduction to Morita equivalence, and more about
this criterion of equivalence can be found in Mere and Veloso (1992), Andre´ka et al. (2008),
and Andre´ka and Ne´meti (2014).
4
where φ(x1, . . . , xn) is a Σ-formula. Similarly, an explicit definition of a function
symbol f ∈ Σ+ − Σ of arity σ1 × . . .× σn → σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x1 . . . ∀σnxn∀σy
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = y ↔ φ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
)
(1)
and an explicit definition of a constant symbol c ∈ Σ+ − Σ of sort σ is a Σ+-
sentence of the form
∀σx
(
x = c↔ ψ(x)) (2)
where φ(x1, . . . , xn, y) and ψ(x) are both Σ-formulas. Note that in all of these
cases it must be that the sorts σ1, . . . , σn, σ ∈ Σ.
Although they are Σ+-sentences, (1) and (2) have consequences in the signa-
ture Σ. In particular, (1) and (2) imply the following sentences, respectively:4
∀σ1x1 . . . ∀σnxn∃σ=1yφ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
∃σ=1xψ(x)
These two sentences are called the admissibility conditions for the explicit
definitions (1) and (2).
We also need to say how to define new sort symbols. Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be
signatures and consider a sort symbol σ ∈ Σ+−Σ. The sort σ can be defined as
a product sort, a coproduct sort, a subsort, or a quotient sort. In each case one
defines σ using old sorts from Σ and new function symbols from Σ+−Σ. These
new function symbols specify how the new sort σ is related to the old sorts in
Σ. We describe in detail these four ways to define new sorts.
In order to define σ as a product sort, one needs two function symbols
pi1, pi2 ∈ Σ+ − Σ with pi1 of arity σ → σ1, pi2 of arity σ → σ2, and σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ.
The function symbols pi1 and pi2 serve as the “canonical projections” associated
with the product sort σ. An explicit definition of the symbols σ, pi1, and pi2 as
a product sort in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x∀σ2y∃σ=1z(pi1(z) = x ∧ pi2(z) = y)
One should think of a product sort σ as the sort whose elements are ordered
pairs, where the first element of each pair is of sort σ1 and the second is of sort
σ2.
One can also define σ as a coproduct sort. In this case, one needs two
function symbols ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Σ+ − Σ with ρ1 of arity σ1 → σ, ρ2 of arity σ2 → σ,
and σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ. The function symbols ρ1 and ρ2 are the “canonical injections”
associated with the coproduct sort σ. An explicit definition of the symbols σ, ρ1,
and ρ2 as a coproduct sort in terms of Σ is a Σ
+-sentence of the form
∀σz
(∃σ1=1x(ρ1(x) = z) ∨ ∃σ2=1y(ρ2(y) = z)) ∧ ∀σ1x∀σ2y¬(ρ1(x) = ρ2(y))
One should think of a coproduct sort σ as the disjoint union of the elements of
sorts σ1 and σ2.
4We will use the notation ∃σ=nxφ(x) and ∃σ≤nxφ(x) throughout to abbreviate the sen-
tences “There exist exactly (respectively, less than than or equal to) n things of sort σ that
are φ.”
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When defining a new sort σ as a product sort or a coproduct sort, one uses
two sort symbols in Σ and two function symbols in Σ+−Σ. The next two ways
of defining a new sort σ only require one sort symbol in Σ and one function
symbol in Σ+ − Σ.
In order to define σ as a subsort, one needs a function symbol i ∈ Σ+−Σ of
arity σ → σ1 with σ1 ∈ Σ. The function symbol i is the “canonical inclusion”
associated with the subsort σ. An explicit definition of the symbols σ and i as
a subsort in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x
(
φ(x)↔ ∃σz(i(z) = x)
) ∧ ∀σz1∀σz2 (i(z1) = i(z2)→ z1 = z2) (3)
where φ(x) is a Σ-formula. One should think of σ as “the things of sort σ1 that
are φ.” The sentence (3) entails the following Σ-sentence:
∃σ1xφ(x)
As above, we will call this Σ-sentence the admissibility condition for the
definition (3).
Lastly, in order to define σ as a quotient sort one needs a function symbol
 ∈ Σ+ − Σ of arity σ1 → σ with σ1 ∈ Σ. An explicit definition of the symbols
σ and  as a quotient sort in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x1∀σ1x2
(
(x1) = (x2)↔ φ(x1, x2)
) ∧ ∀σz∃σ1x((x) = z) (4)
where φ(x1, x2) is a Σ-formula. This sentence defines σ as a quotient sort
that is obtained by “quotienting out” the sort σ1 with respect to the formula
φ(x1, x2). The sort σ should be thought of as the set of “equivalence classes of
elements of σ1 with respect to the relation φ(x1, x2),” and the function symbol
 is the “canonical projection” that maps an element to its equivalence class.
And indeed, one can verify that the sentence (4) implies that φ(x1, x2) is an
equivalence relation. In particular, (4) entails the following Σ-sentences:
∀σ1xφ(x, x)
∀σ1x1∀σ1x2(φ(x1, x2)→ φ(x2, x1))
∀σ1x1∀σ1x2∀σ1x3
(
(φ(x1, x2) ∧ φ(x2, x3))→ φ(x1, x3)
)
These Σ-sentences are the admissibility conditions for the definition (4).
Now that we have described the four ways of defining new sort symbols,
we can define the concept of a Morita extension. One can think of a Morita
extension of a theory T as a theory that results from adding “abbreviations” or
“shorthand” to the theory T in the form of new defined symbols. Let Σ ⊂ Σ+
be signatures and T a Σ-theory. A Morita extension of T to the signature
Σ+ is a Σ+-theory
T+ = T ∪ {δs : s ∈ Σ+ − Σ}
that satisfies the following three conditions. First, for each symbol s ∈ Σ+ − Σ
the sentence δs is an explicit definition of s in terms of Σ. Second, if σ ∈ Σ+−Σ
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is a sort symbol and f ∈ Σ+−Σ is a function symbol that is used in the explicit
definition of σ, then δf = δσ. (For example, if σ is defined as a product sort with
projections pi1 and pi2, then δσ = δpi1 = δpi2 .) And third, if αs is an admissibility
condition for a definition δs, then T  αs.
As we will discuss in section 5, there is a natural sense in which a Morita
extension of a theory “says no more” than the original theory. Indeed, one can
show that if T+ is a Morita extension of T , then T+ is a conservative extension
of T (Barrett and Halvorson, 2016, Theorem 4.2). Using the concept of a Morita
extension, we have the machinery to define Morita equivalence.
Definition 2. Let T1 be a Σ1-theory and T2 a Σ2-theory. T1 and T2 are Morita
equivalent if there are theories T 11 , . . . , T
n
1 and T
1
2 , . . . , T
m
2 that satisfy the
following three conditions:
• Each theory T i+11 is a Morita extension of T i1,
• Each theory T i+12 is a Morita extension of T i2,
• Tn1 and Tm2 are logically equivalent Σ-theories with Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ⊂ Σ.
We will often call the theory Tn1 (or similarly, T
m
2 ) the “common Morita
extension” of T1 and T2. Two theories are therefore Morita equivalent if they
have a common Morita extension in this precise sense. The intuition behind
Morita equivalence is simple: T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent if they each can,
in compatible ways, define all of the vocabulary that the other uses. Morita
equivalence captures a sense in which two theories are “intertranslatable.” In-
deed, one can show that if T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent, then there is a
natural way to convert models of T1 into models of T2, and vice versa (Barrett
and Halvorson, 2016, Theorem 5.1). And in addition, there is a natural way
to translate sentences between the two theories (Barrett and Halvorson, 2016,
Theorem 4.3).
4 Equivalent formulations of geometry
With the concept of Morita equivalence in hand, we can now discuss these
different formulations of geometry. All of the geometries that we will consider
are formulated using (some subset of) the following vocabulary.5
• The sort symbols σp and σ` will indicate the sort of points and the sort of
lines, respectively. We will use letters from the beginning of the alphabet
like a, b, c to denote variables of sort σp, and letters from the end of the
alphabet like x, y, z to denote variables of sort σ`.
• The predicate symbol r(a, x) of arity σp × σ` indicates that the point a
lies on the line x.
5We follow Schwabha¨user et al. (1983) in this regard.
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• The predicate symbol s(a, b, c) of arity σp × σp × σp indicates that the
points a, b and c are colinear.
• The predicate symbol p(x, y) of arity σ`×σ` indicates that the lines x and
y intersect.
• Lastly, the predicate symbol o(x, y, z) of arity σ` × σ` × σ` indicates that
the lines x, y and z are compunctual, i.e. that they all intersect at a single
point.
We now prove two theorems that capture the equivalence between geometries
with points and geometries with lines. We then provide three examples that
illustrate the generality of these results.
4.1 Two theorems
Suppose that we are given a formulation of geometry T that uses both of the
sort symbols σp and σ`. The two theorems that we will prove in this section
show that, given some natural assumptions, the theory T is Morita equivalent
both to a theory Tp that only uses the sort σp, and to a theory T` that only uses
the sort σ`. In this sense, therefore, the geometry T can be formulated using
only points, only lines, or both points and lines.
Our first theorem captures a sense in which the geometry T can be formu-
lated using only points. In order to prove this theorem, we will need the following
important result. The proof of this proposition is given by Schwabha¨user et al.
(1983, Proposition 4.59).
Proposition 1 (Elimination of line variables). Let T be a theory formulated
in the signature Σ = {σp, σ`, r, s}, and suppose that T entails the following
sentences:
1. (a 6= b)→ ∃=1x (r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x))
2. ∀x∃a∃b (r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x) ∧ (a 6= b))
3. s(a, b, c)↔ ∃x (r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x) ∧ r(c, x))
Then for every Σ-formula φ without free variables of sort σl, there is a Σ-formula
φ∗, whose free variables are included in those of φ, that contains no variables of
sort σ`, and such that T  ∀~a(φ(~a)↔ φ∗(~a)).
We should take a moment here to unravel the intuition behind this propo-
sition. The theory T can be thought of as a geometry that is formulated in
terms of points and lines, using the basic notions of a point lying on a line and
three points being colinear. Since the theory T is a geometry, the sentences 1, 2,
and 3 are sentences that one should naturally expect T to satisfy. Given these
assumptions on T , Proposition 1 simply guarantees that Σ-formulas φ can be
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“translated” into corresponding formulas φ∗ that do not use the apparatus of
lines.6 With this proposition in hand, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Let T be a theory that satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 1.
Then there is a theory Tp in the restricted signature Σ0 = Σ − {σ`, r} that is
Morita equivalent to T .
Theorem 1 captures a sense in which every geometry that is formulated with
points and lines could be formulated equally well using only points. The idea
behind the proof of Theorem 1 should be clear. Consider the Σ0-theory defined
by
Tp = {φ∗ : T  φ},
where the existence of the sentences φ∗ is guaranteed by the fact that T satisfies
the hypotheses of Proposition 1. The theory Tp can be thought of as a theory
that “says the same thing as T ,” but uses only the apparatus of points. One
proves Theorem 1 by showing that this theory Tp has the resources to define
the sort σ` of lines.
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Proof of Theorem 1. It suffices to show that the theories T and Tp are Morita
equivalent. The following figure illustrates the structure of our argument:
T
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Tp
T 1p
T 2p
T 3p
T 4p
· · ·
T+∼=
We begin on the right-hand side of the figure by building four theories T 1p , T
2
p ,
T 3p , and T
4
p . The purpose of these theories is to define, using the resources of
the theory Tp, the symbols σ` and r.
Step 1. The theory T 1p is the Morita extension of Tp obtained by defining a
new sort symbol σp × σp as a product sort (of the sort σp with itself). We can
think of the elements of the sort σp × σp as pairs of points. The theory T 1p is a
6This translation eliminates the line variables from every Σ-formula in two steps. First, one
uses the fact that every line is uniquely characterized by two non-identical points lying on it to
replace equalities between line variables with more complex expressions using the predicate r.
Second, one replaces instances of the predicate r(a, x) by using complex expressions involving
the colinearity predicate s(a, b, c). The reader is encouraged to consult Schwabha¨user et al.
(1983, Proposition 4.59) for details.
7Note that in the following proof we abuse our convention and occasionally use the variables
x, y, z as variables that are not of sort σ`. But the sort of variables should always be clear
from context.
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Morita extension of Tp to the signature Σ0 ∪ {σp × σp, pi1, pi2}, where pi1 and pi2
are both function symbols of arity σp × σp → σp.
Step 2. The theory T 2p is the Morita extension of T
1
p obtained by defining
a new sort symbol σs as a subsort of σp × σp. The elements of sort σs are
the elements (a, b) of sort σp × σp such that a 6= b. One can easily write out
the defining formula for the subsort σs to guarantee that this is the case. We
can think of the elements of sort σs as the pairs of distinct points, or more
intuitively, as the “line segments formed between distinct points.” The theory
T 2p is a Morita extension of T
1
p to the signature Σ0∪{σp×σp, pi1, pi2, σs, i}, where
i is a function symbol of arity σs → σp × σp.
Step 3. The theory T 2p employs a sort of “line segments”, but we do not
yet have a sort of lines. Indeed, we need to take care of the fact that some line
segments determine the same line. We do this by considering the theory T 3p , the
Morita extension of T 2p obtained by defining the sort symbol σ` as a quotient
sort of σs using the formula
s(pi1 ◦ i(x), pi1 ◦ i(y), pi2 ◦ i(y)) ∧ s(pi2 ◦ i(x), pi1 ◦ i(y), pi2 ◦ i(y))
Using the fact that T is a conservative extension of Tp, one can easily verify
that T 2p satisfies the admissibility conditions for this definition, i.e. the above
formula is an equivalence relation according to T 2p . The idea here is simple:
Two line segments (a1, a2) and (b1, b2) determine the same line just in case the
points a1, b1, b2 are colinear and the points a2, b1, b2 are too. The theory T
3
p
simply identifies the line segments that determine the same line in this sense.
We have now defined the sort σ` of lines. The theory T
3
p is a Morita extension
of T 2p to the signature Σ0 ∪ {σp × σp, pi1, pi2, σs, i, σ`, }, where  is a function
symbol of sort σs → σ`.
Step 4. All that remains on the right-hand side of the figure is to define
the predicate symbol r. The theory T 4p is the Morita extension of T
3
p obtained
by defining the predicate r(a, z) using the formula
∃σp×σpx∃σsy(pi1(x) = a ∧ i(y) = x ∧ (y) = z)
The idea here is again intuitive. A point a is on a line z just in case there
is another point b such that the pair of points (a, b) determines the line l.
(In the above formula, one can think of the variable x as playing the role of
this pair (a, b).) The theory T 4p is a Morita extension of T
3
p to the signature
Σ0 ∪ {σp × σp, pi1, pi2, σs, i, σ`, , r}.
Step 5. We now turn to the left-hand side of our organizational figure. The
theory T is formulated in the signature Σ, so it needs to define all of the new
symbols that we added to the theory Tp in the course of defining σp and r.
The theory T defines the symbols σp × σp, pi1, pi2, σs, i in the obvious manner.
For example, it defines σp × σp as the product sort (of σp with itself) with the
projections pi1 and pi2.
We still need, however, to define the function symbol . The function 
intuitively maps a pair of distinct points to the line that they determine. This
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suggests that we define (x) = y using the formula
r(pi1 ◦ i(x), y) ∧ r(pi2 ◦ i(x), y)
Intuitively, this formula is saying that a pair of points x = (x1, x2) determines
a line y just in case x1 is on y and x2 is on y. We call the theory that results
from defining all of these symbols T+.
Step 6. All that remains now is to show that the theory T 4p is logically
equivalent to the theory T+. This argument is mainly a tedious verification.
The only non-trivial part of the argument is the following: One needs to show
that T 4p  φ for every sentence φ such that T  φ. One does this by verifying that
T 4p itself entails the three sentences 1, 2, and 3 in the statement of Proposition
1. This means that T 4p entails the sentences φ ↔ φ∗ for every Σ-sentence φ.
In conjunction with the fact that T 4p  φ∗ for every consequence φ of T , this
implies that T 4p  φ. The theories T 4p and T+ are logically equivalent, so Tp and
T must be Morita equivalent.
Our second theorem is perfectly analogous to Theorem 1. It captures a sense
in which a geometry T can be formulated using only lines. As with Theorem
1, we will need a preliminary result. The proof of the following proposition is
given by Schwabha¨user et al. (1983, Proposition 4.89).
Proposition 2 (Elimination of point variables). Let T be a theory formulated
in the signature Σ = {σp, σ`, r, p, o}, and suppose that T implies the following
sentences:
1. (x 6= y)→ ∃≤1a(r(a, x) ∧ r(a, y))
2. ∀a∃x∃y((x 6= y) ∧ r(a, x) ∧ r(a, y))
3. o(x, y, z)↔ ∃a(r(a, x) ∧ r(a, y) ∧ r(a, z))
4. p(x, y)↔ ((x 6= y) ∧ s(x, y, y))
5. p(x, y)↔ ((x 6= y) ∧ ∃a(r(a, x) ∧ r(a, y)))
Then for every Σ-formula φ without free variables of sort σp, there is a Σ-
formula φ∗, whose free variables are included in those of φ, that contains no
variables of sort σp, and such that T  ∀~x(φ(~x)↔ φ∗(~x)).
Proposition 2 is perfectly analogous to Proposition 1. One again thinks of
the theory T as a geometry, and so the sentences 1–5 are sentences that one
naturally expects T to satisfy. Proposition 2 guarantees that Σ-formulas can be
“translated” into formulas φ∗ that do not use the apparatus of points.8 With
Proposition 2 in hand, we have the following result.
8Analogous to Proposition 1, one proves this proposition by showing that variables of sort
σp can be eliminated in the following manner. One first replaces equalities between these
variables, and then interprets r(a, x) in terms of o(y, z, x), where y and z have a as their
intersection point. The reader is invited to consult Schwabha¨user et al. (1983, Proposition
4.89) for further details.
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Theorem 2. Let T be a theory that satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 2.
There is a theory T` in the restricted signature Σ0 = Σ− {σp, r} that is Morita
equivalent to T .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, so we will not go into
as much detail. Consider the Σ0-theory T` defined by T` = {φ∗ : T  φ}, where
the existence of the sentences φ∗ is guaranteed since T satisfies the hypotheses
of Proposition 2. One shows that the theory T` is Morita equivalent to T . The
theory T` needs to define the sort symbol σp. It does this by first defining a
product sort of “pairs of lines,” and then a subsort of “pairs of intersecting
lines.” The sort of points is then the quotient sort that results from identifying
two pairs of intersecting lines (w, x) and (y, z) just in case both w, x, y and
w, x, z are compunctual. The theory T` also needs to define the symbol r. It
does this simply by requiring that r(a, x) holds of a point a and a line x just in
case there is another line y such that the pair of lines (x, y) intersect at the point
a. As in the proof of Theorem 1, T defines the symbols of T` in the natural
way.
4.2 Three examples
Theorem 1 shows that every geometry formulated using points and lines could
be formulated equally well using only points; Theorem 2 shows that it could
be formulated equally well using only lines. These two results together capture
a robust sense in which geometries with points and geometries with lines are
equivalent theories.
Theorems 1 and 2 are quite general. Indeed, one can verify that many of
the theories that we usually think of as geometries satisfy the hypotheses of the
two theorems. We provide three examples here. We begin by revisiting a simple
geometric theory that we considered earlier.
Example 1. Recall the above diagram of six lines and five points in the Eu-
clidean plane. By interpreting the symbols σp, σ`, r, s, p, and o in the natural
way, one can easily convert this diagram into a {σp, σ`, r, s, p, o}-structure M .
We now consider the geometric theory Th(M) = {φ : M  φ}. One can verify
by inspection that Th(M) satisfies the hypotheses of both Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1 implies that this diagram can be fully described using only the appa-
ratus of points (using the theory Th(M)p), while Theorem 2 implies that it can
be fully described using only the apparatus of lines (using the theory Th(M)`),
and all three of these theories are Morita equivalent. y
In our next two examples, we consider more general geometric theories:
Projective geometry and affine geometry.
Example 2 (Projective geometry). Projective geometry is a theory Tproj for-
mulated in the signature {σp, σ`, r}, where all of these symbols are understood
exactly as above. The theory Tproj has the following three axioms (Barnes and
Mack, 1975).
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• a 6= b→ ∃=1x(r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x))
• x 6= y → ∃=1a(r(a, x) ∧ r(a, y)
• There are at least four points, no three of which lie on the same line.
(One can easily express the third axiom as a sentence of first-order logic, but
we here refrain for the sake of clarity.)
Projective geometry satisfies the hypotheses of both Theorems 1 and 2. We
consider Theorem 2. In order to apply this result, we need to add the following
two axioms that define the symbols p and o:
p(x, y)↔ (x 6= y ∧ ∃a(r(a, x) ∧ r(a, y))) (θp)
o(x, y, z)↔ ∃a(r(a, x) ∧ r(a, y) ∧ r(a, z)) (θo)
One can easily verify that the {σ`, σp, r, p, o}-theory T+proj obtained by adding
the definitions θp and θo to the axioms of Tproj satisfies the sentences 1–5 of
Proposition 2. Theorem 2 then implies that there is a theory in the restricted
signature {σ`, p, c} that is Morita equivalent to T+proj. Projective geometry can
therefore be formulated using only the apparatus of lines. One argues in a
perfectly analogous manner to show that Theorem 1 also applies to projective
geometry, so it can also be formulated using only the apparatus of points. y
Example 3 (Affine geometry). Affine geometry is a theory Taff formulated
in the signature {σ`, σp, r}, where all of these symbols are again understood
exactly as above. The theory Taff has the following five axioms (Veblen and
Young, 1918, p. 118).
• a 6= b→ ∃x(r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x))
• ¬r(a, x)→ ∃=1y(r(a, y) ∧ ∀b(r(b, y)→ ¬r(b, x)))
• ∀x∃a∃b(a 6= b ∧ r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x))
• ∃a∃b∃c(a 6= b ∧ a 6= c ∧ b 6= c ∧ ¬∃x(r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x) ∧ r(c, x)))
• Pappus’ theorem (Veblen and Young, 1918, p. 103 and Figure 40).
The fifth axiom can easily be written as a first-order sentence in the signature
{σ`, σp, r}, but since this axiom is not used in the following argument, we leave
its translation to the reader. (Indeed, one only needs the first, third, and fourth
axioms of Taff to complete all of the following verifications.)
Affine geometry satisfies the hypotheses of both Theorems 1 and 2. We
consider Theorem 1. In order to apply this result, we need to add one additional
axiom to Taff that defines the symbol s as follows:
s(a, b, c)↔ ∃x(r(a, x) ∧ r(b, x) ∧ r(c, x)) (θs)
It is now trivial to verify that the sentences 1–3 of Proposition 1 are satisfied
by the {σ`, σp, r, s}-theory T+aff that is obtained by adding the sentence θs to
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the axioms of Taff. Theorem 1 therefore implies that there is a theory in the
restricted signature {σp, s} that is Morita equivalent to T+aff, capturing a sense
in which affine geometry can be formulated using only the apparatus of points.
In a perfectly analogous manner, one can apply the Theorem 2 to the case of
affine geometry. This captures a sense in which affine geometry can also be
formulated using only lines. y
Example 3 is more general than it might initially appear. Indeed, affine
geometry serves as the foundation for many of our most familiar geometries.
For example, by supplementing the affine geometry with the proper notion of
orthogonality, one can obtain two dimensional Euclidean geometry or two di-
mensional Minkowski geometry.9 Theorems 1 and 2 therefore capture a sense
in which both Euclidean geometry and Minkowski geometry can be formulated
using either points or lines.
5 Morita equivalence and ontological commit-
ment
Our discussion has shown that a geometric theory can be formulated using
points or using lines, and furthermore, that these two formulations are perfectly
equivalent. Putnam seems to agree that point-based and line-based geometries
are equivalent.10 He must therefore be committed to a standard of equivalence
that is more liberal than both logical equivalence and Glymour’s definitional
equivalence. We suggest that Morita equivalence is, in fact, a reasonable stan-
dard of equivalence, and one that Putnam and Goodman should be willing to
adopt.
One might worry, however, that Morita equivalence is too liberal. In par-
ticular, one might worry that Morita equivalence begs the question in favor of
conceptual relativism, since it allows new sorts (and hence new objects) to be
defined out of old ones. We do not find this worry to be particularly trouble-
some. In fact, there is a sense in which Putnam goes wrong when he suggests
that the two geometric descriptions (in terms of points and lines, respectively)
involve different ontological commitments. If T and T ′ are Morita equivalent
theories, then there is a natural way to view them according to which they make
precisely the same ontological commitments.
It will suffice to restrict our attention to the specific case of Morita equiv-
alence where T ′ is a Morita extension of T . Suppose that the theory T is
formulated in a signature Σ with two sort symbols σ and τ , and that T ′ is a
Morita extension of T to the signature Σ′ ⊃ Σ. The theory T ′ might therefore
add to T the following new sorts: subsorts of σ, the product σ×τ , the coproduct
σ+ τ , or quotients of equivalence classes of elements of σ.11 We will argue that,
9See Coxeter (1955), Szczerba and Tarski (1979), Szczerba (1986, p. 910), or Goldblatt
(1987) for details.
10For example, see Putnam (1977, 489-91), Putnam (1992, 109, 115-20), and Putnam (2001).
11T ′ could also add product and coproduct sorts σ× σ, τ × τ , σ+ σ, and τ + τ , along with
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despite the fact that T ′ introduces these new sort symbols, there is a natural
sense in which the ontological commitments of T ′ do not exceed those of T .
Indeed, one can easily view these new sorts of objects as logical constructions
(in the sense of Russell) from the objects of sorts σ and τ .
We show this by describing how each of the new quantifier phrases “There
is a thing of the new sort . . . ” in the language of T ′ exactly paraphrases (or ab-
breviates, or is shorthand for) an old quantifier phrase “There are things of the
old sorts . . . ” in the language of T . Adding these new sort symbols and asso-
ciated quantifiers to the theory T , therefore, does not increase one’s ontological
commitments. Rather, it is just a way of making more explicit the ontological
commitments of the original theory T . Precisely how this paraphrasing works
depends on what kind of “new sort” appears in the new quantifier phrase, so
we consider the four cases in detail.12
Subsorts. The first case is straightforward. Let φ be a Σ-formula and suppose
that T ′ defines a new sort symbol σφ as the subsort containing those objects of
sort σ that are φ. Consider the quantifier phrase “There is a thing of sort σφ
that is ψ” in the language of the theory T ′. This expression can naturally be
thought of as paraphrasing the expression “There is a thing of sort σ that is φ
and ψ” in the restricted language of the theory T . In fact, there is a way to
make this intuition perfectly precise. If ψ(x) is a Σ′-formula with the variable
x of sort σφ, then one can show that
T ′  ∃σφxψ(x)↔ ∃σy (ψ∗(y) ∧ φ(y)),
where here ψ∗ is a particular Σ-formula that can be thought of as the “trans-
lation” of the Σ′-formula ψ. This shows that the new existential quantifier ∃σφ
that accompanies the new sort σφ can be defined in terms of the existential
quantifier ∃σ that was “already there” in the theory T . Introducing the rela-
tivized quantifier ∃σφ is simply a convenient shorthand. Indeed, the new sort
σφ does not contain “new objects” that are independent of the old objects. It
instead just provides us with a new way of talking about some of the objects of
sort σ, namely those objects that are φ.
Product sorts. The same idea holds in the case where T ′ adds a new product
sort σ× τ . The theory T implicitly quantifies over objects of sort σ× τ , and all
expressions about objects of sort σ× τ can be translated into expressions about
objects of the corresponding individual sorts σ and τ . In particular, the new
quantifier phrase “There is a thing of sort σ × τ that is ψ” (in the language of
T ′) can be thought of as paraphrasing the old quantifier phrase “There is one
subsorts and quotient sorts of τ . We omit discussion of these cases, however, since they are
essentially the same as the ones that we do discuss.
12We are here simply unraveling the idea behind Barrett and Halvorson (2016, Theorem
4.3). Indeed, all of the following offset equations are simple corollaries to this theorem. The
reader is encouraged to consult that result and its proof for additional details and also Andre´ka
and Ne´meti (2014, §5).
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thing of sort σ and another of sort τ such that the pair is ψ” (in the language of
T ). One makes this idea precise in exactly the same manner as above. If ψ(x)
is a Σ′-formula with the variable x of sort σ × τ , then one can show that
T ′  ∃σ×τxψ(x)↔ ∃σy1∃τy2 ψ∗(y1, y2),
where again ψ∗ is a Σ-formula that is the “translation” of ψ into the language
of the theory T . All quantifier phrases in the new language of T ′ can be thought
of as simply paraphrasing more complex quantifier phrases in the old language
of the theory T . Indeed, we have just seen how the new existential quantifier
∃σ×τ can be defined in terms of the existential quantifiers ∃σ and ∃τ from the
language of the theory T .
As a specific example, suppose that T is a theory about persons, marriage,
and net income. Suppose in particular that T tells us which people are married,
and what each individual’s net income is. Without expanding one’s ontology in
the slightest bit, one can easily extend T to a theory T ′ that includes a sort σ′ for
married couples, and a predicate of sort σ′ that applies to those married couples
whose joint income is greater than $100,000 per year. This new theory T ′ may
be more convenient for calculating tax debts, but it does not say anything more
than the original theory T .13
Coproduct sorts. The situation is again the same when T ′ adds a coproduct
sort σ + τ . Introducing coproduct sorts simply allows one to unify distinct
domains of objects into a common domain. If T is a theory about two different
kinds of things, of sorts σ and τ , then one can extend T to a theory T ′ built
on the “common sort” σ + τ . Once again, all expressions about objects of sort
σ+ τ can be understood as shorthand for expressions about the objects of sorts
σ and τ . In particular, the quantifier phrase “There exists something of sort
σ+τ that is ψ” (in the language of T ′) paraphrases the expression “Either there
is something of sort σ that is ψ or there is something of sort τ that is ψ” (in
the language of T ). One makes this thought precise in the now familiar way. If
ψ(x) is a Σ+-formula with x a variable of sort σ + τ , then one can show that
the new existential quantifier ∃σ+τ can be defined in terms of the quantifiers ∃σ
and ∃τ in the following manner:
T ′  ∃σ+τxψ(x)↔
(∃σy1 ψ∗(y1) ∨ ∃τy2ψ∗∗(y2)),
where again the Σ-formulas ψ∗ and ψ∗∗ can be thought of as the “translations”
of ψ into the signature Σ.
13A naive metaphysical realist might be tempted to argue that despite the fact that we can
add a sort σ×τ , there remains a sense in which objects of sort σ×τ are derived entities — i.e.
they depend on objects of sorts σ and τ . In the case of geometric theories, this response misses
the mark. The upshot of our results above is that lines can be defined as (equivalence classes
of) pairs of points, and points can be defined as (equivalence classes of) pairs of lines. Thus,
there is no clear sense in which the line sort is “derived” and the point sort is “fundamental”,
or vice versa.
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Quotient sorts. This final case might seem the most controversial, since in-
troducing quotient sorts seems to allow one to quantify over classes. This ma-
neuver is permitted, however, because the equivalence classes under considera-
tion are always required to be definable using the resources of first-order logic.
Suppose that T ′ adds a new quotient sort σθ, i.e. the sort of equivalence classes
(of things of sort σ) with respect to the equivalence relation θ. In this case the
quantifier phrase “There exists something of sort σθ that is ψ” (in the language
of T ′) can be understood as paraphrasing the more complex expression “There
exists something of sort σ such that it, and everything θ-related to it, is ψ” (in
the language of T ). One makes this precise again by showing that if ψ(x) is a
Σ′-formula with x a variable of sort σθ, then
T ′  ∃σθxψ(x)↔ ∃σy
(
ψ∗(y) ∧ ∀σz(θ(y, z)→ ψ∗(z))
)
,
where again the Σ-formula ψ∗ results from “translating” ψ into the signature Σ.
As in all of the above cases, this captures a precise sense in which the new exis-
tential quantifier ∃σθ can be defined in terms of the old existential quantifier ∃σ.
In each of these cases, we have described how the new existential quantifier
phrases of T ′ merely paraphrase more complex existential quantifier phrases of
T . (It is easy to convince oneself that the same holds for the universal quantifier
phrases of T ′.) In this sense, therefore, one need not think of the quantifiers
∃σφ , ∃σ×τ , ∃σ+τ , and ∃σθ as “new” to the theory T ′. Rather, there is a sense
in which they were implicitly there in the theory T to begin with. The theory
T ′ does allow one to use these new symbols ∃σφ , ∃σ×τ , ∃σ+τ , and ∃σθ , but this
does not increase the expressive power of T ′ over that of T . The two theories
allow one to “quantify over” precisely the same things; they simply use different
languages to do so.
This discussion allows us to recognize a natural sense in which moving from
the theory T to its Morita extension T ′ does not increase ontological commit-
ments. Indeed, if one is inclined to think that the ontological commitments of
a theory can be “read off” from what the theory quantifies over, then T ′ and T
make precisely the same ontological commitments.
6 Reconsidering conceptual relativity
Putnam and Goodman often cite the case of point-based geometry Tp and line-
based geometry T` as an example of “incompatible” but “equally correct” theo-
ries.14 For example, Putnam (1992, 115-6) describes Goodman’s view as follows:
Goodman regards these two versions of [geometry] as ‘incompatible’.
At the same time, he regards them as both right. And since incom-
patible versions cannot be true of the same world, he concludes that
they are true of different worlds ‘if true of any.’
14See Putnam (1977, 489-91), Putnam (1992, 109, 115-20), Putnam (2001), and Goodman
(1975, 1978). For further discussion of these arguments see Wright (1997, 300) and Cohnitz
and Rossberg (2014, 216).
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In their argument from geometry, Putnam and Goodman then claim that the
existence of incompatible but equally correct theories like Tp and T` forces one
to abandon metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realists are committed to the
idea that there is one theory that correctly describes the world. Since the two
theories Tp and T` are incompatible, therefore, metaphysical realism requires
that at most one of them provides a correct description of the world. But the
two theories are equally correct, so if Tp correctly describes the world, then so
does T`, and vice versa. This is a contradiction, so metaphysical realism itself
must be false.
Consider again the point-based and line-based descriptions Tp and T` of the
diagram from section 2 above. Putnam and Goodman would claim that Tp and
T` are incompatible since Tp says that there are five things, while T` says that
there are six things. At the same time, however, they would claim that Tp and
T` are equally correct theories. Perhaps because Putnam and Goodman rarely
provide justification for this second claim, it is the part of their argument from
geometry that is most often rejected by metaphysical realists (see, for example,
Sider (2009) or Van Inwagen (2009)). Their basic idea behind the standard
metaphysical realist response is that the world is either made up fundamentally
of points or of lines. In the first case the point-based theory Tp is clearly “more
correct” than the line-based theory T`, while in the latter T` is “more correct”
than Tp.
We would like to suggest an alternative way of responding to Putnam and
Goodman that is motivated by the theorems proved above. Our response differs
from the standard metaphysical realist response in that we accept Putnam and
Goodman’s claim that Tp and T` are equally correct theories. We simply ask
that they be clear about exactly what justifies this claim. The concept of Morita
equivalence provides us with a particularly natural way to do this: Tp and T`
are equally correct in the precise sense (implied by Theorems 1 and 2) that they
are Morita equivalent. In other words, they are equally correct in the sense
that they are the same theory. And this leads us to our place of disagreement
with Putnam and Goodman. We disagree with their claim that Tp and T` are
incompatible. To the contrary, once one is clear about what justifies the claim
that Tp and T` are equally correct one sees that there is also a sense (again
implied by Theorems 1 and 2) in which they are perfectly compatible theories:
They have a common Morita extension T+. This common Morita extension
T+ is a theory that quantifies over both points and lines. The theories Tp and
T` are simply convenient ways of expressing the geometric facts that are more
fully expressed by the comprehensive theory T+. The argument from geometry
was therefore based from the start on a misconception about why we should
consider these theories to be equally correct. These theories are equally correct
because they are equivalent. Far from being incompatible, the two are actually
the same theory.
Our response to Putnam and Goodman requires that one adopt Morita
equivalence as the standard for equivalence between first-order theories. This is
one of the best standards for equivalence of first-order theories that is currently
on the table, and we believe that Putnam and Goodman should be willing to
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adopt it. But even if they were to adopt some other standard, their argument
from geometry would still be problematic. In conjunction with the standard
metaphysical realist response to Putnam and Goodman, our discussion here
demonstrates that there is a tension between (on the one hand) the claim that
Tp and T` are equally correct and (on the other hand) the claim that Tp and T`
are incompatible. Indeed, Putnam and Goodman face the following dilemma:
Either they assert that Tp and T` are equivalent theories or they
assert that Tp and T` are inequivalent theories.
In the first case, it becomes difficult for them to maintain that Tp and T` are
incompatible. After all, since Tp and T` are actually the same theory, they
are perfectly compatible. In the second case, it becomes difficult for them to
maintain that Tp and T` are equally correct. If Tp and T` are inequivalent
theories, then this means that they do not “say the same thing” about the
world. Since they say different things about the world, the one theory could
very well provide a correct description while the other fails to do so. The two
theories are therefore not equally correct.
If Putnam and Goodman adopt a standard for equivalence — like Morita
equivalence — according to which Tp and T` are equivalent, then they face
the first horn of this dilemma. If they adopt a more restrictive standard for
equivalence — like definitional equivalence — according to which Tp and T` are
inequivalent, then they face the second horn. In either case, their argument
from geometry does not go through. This dilemma also allows one to locate our
response to the argument from geometry with respect to the standard meta-
physical realist response. Since we are inclined to adopt Morita equivalence as
the standard for equivalence of first-order theories, we think that Putnam and
Goodman are forced into the first horn of the dilemma. Metaphysical realists,
on the other hand, have not yet adopted Morita equivalence as their standard for
equivalence of first-order theories,15 so they think that Putnam and Goodman
are forced into the second horn of the dilemma.
In addition to their impact on Putnam and Goodman’s argument from ge-
ometry, our theorems here yield one more philosophical payoff. In order to
recognize the sense in which geometries with points and geometries with lines
are equivalent, one relies on the resources of many-sorted logic, and in particular,
the concept of Morita equivalence. The many-sorted framework has, unfortu-
nately, been mostly ignored by philosophers during the last half-century. This
attitude towards many-sorted logic can be traced to an argument of Quine’s.
Quine famously suggested that the many-sorted framework was dispensable,
and that philosophers were licensed to ignore it altogether.16 His idea was that
15Either because they have consciously adopted a more restrictive standard or because they
are not aware that a principled standard exists that judge Tp and T` to be equivalent.
16Quine (1960, 229) says: “All in all, I find an overwhelming case for a single unpartitioned
universe of values of bound variables, and a simple grammar of predication which admits
general terms all on an equal footing. Subsidiary distinctions can still be drawn as one
pleases, both on methodological considerations and on considerations of natural kind; but we
may think of them as distinctions special to the sciences and unreflected in the structure of
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many-sorted logic and single-sorted logic are “intertranslatable,” so nothing of
real philosophical significance could turn on the use of one of the frameworks
rather than the other.
Although there is a precise sense in which the many-sorted and single-sorted
frameworks are intertranslatable (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b, Theorem 2),
our results here demonstrate that Quine was mistaken about the upshot of this
logical fact. It does not imply that many-sorted logic is dispensable. As our
discussion of geometric theories shows, the many-sorted framework allows us
to better recognize different standards of equivalence between theories. The
single-sorted framework does not naturally allow one to capture, for example,
any sense in which Euclidean geometry with points is the same as Euclidean
geometry with lines. But with Morita equivalence in hand, the many-sorted
framework does allow one to capture the equivalence between point-based and
line-based geometric theories. When Quine argues that nothing of philosophical
significance turns on the use of many-sorted as opposed to the standard single-
sorted framework, therefore, he is mistaken. We ignore sorts at our own peril.
By doing so, we blind ourselves to the variety of ways in which theories can be
equivalent.
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